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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between trade liberalisation, consumers’
environmental awareness and a negative environmental externality in consumption.
We adopt an international Hotelling duopoly setup, where firms are located in two
asymmetric countries. We find that, if the intensity of environmental externality is
common knowledge for country governments, this setup delivers no need of accom-
panying trade policies in order to enforce trade liberalisation. In the opposite case,
in which information is asymmetric, i.e., the small country’s Government cannot
observe the positive enviromental effects of its firm’s exports to foreign consumers,
we find that: (i) the Pareto optimum is always enforced, since the brown country
always relaxes the distortionary trade policy, and (ii) cheating on the environmental
externality allows the brown country’s government to extract extra surplus from the
green country. Allowing for trade in green technology delivers opposite conclusions:
the externality is minimised and welfare is maximised in equilibrium if information
is symmetric while trade liberalisation with asymmetric information always entails
a second best outcome.
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1 Introduction
Despite the large research effort of the past two decades, the relationship between trade
openness and enviromental impact of production/consumption is still far from being fully
identified and, under several respects, it still represents a challenging issue for economists.
A large part of this effort has built a view1 according to which trade is often claimed to
be the cause of short-run asymmetric environmental effects that - if adequately taken into
account by countries’ governments - may pose a serious threat to the bilateral opening of
commercial frontiers.2 A relevant number of contributions have in fact investigated the
way governments shape their environmental policies in order to contrast or even reinforce
the effects of trade and trade policies.3
On the contrary, fewer works have investigated the case in which the reverse holds, that
is trade policies are used to meet environmental goals. This is equivalent to ask whether
environmental issues exert any effect on countries’ bilateral terms of trade, even supposing
that no environmental policy can be undertaken. This case may occur, for instance, as
a consequence of the high political and administrative costs associated to environmental
policies, especially to those encompassing the control of polluting emissions. Furthermore,
note that these costs are likely to be higher for the poorer or the less developed among
the trading countries, the latter being also those where the environmental awareness of
citizen/consumers has less likely been developed. If this were the case, trade policies, e.g.
the creation of trade barriers, could be the cheapest and most effective tools a government
might use to maximise social welfare.
The latter case is indeed the one tackled by our contibution. We rely on a two-country
international Hotelling duopoly where countries are asymmetric, in the light of [20], [34]
and [16]. In our view, country size is synonym of population size and, accordingly, we
identify the larger country as the poorest/less developed one, hosting the only polluting
firm in the economy and being endowed with an environmentally unaware population.4
On the contrary, the smaller country is green from the outset, meaning that it has an
environmentally aware population and a firm producing a green good. In our setup, all
the citizens of a given country - whether they are environmentally aware or not - suffer
from a negative externality which stems from the national consumption of the brown
1To this regard, a notable issue is the distinction between short-run and long-run trade environmental
effects, which claims for a deep investigation of the relationship between trade, growth and environment.
To this regard, several empirical contributions support the environmental Kuznets theory, according to
which the long-run effect of trade may result as positive. A basic explanation for this is that trade
boosts countries’ GDP growth process, thereby also accellerating the process of ”green” technological
innovation/adoption. According to the scheme proposed by [1], in fact, the aggregate effect of trade
depends on the sign and the magnitude of the so-called ”scale”, ”technique” and ”composition” effects.
To this regard, see, beetween others, [14], [23], [6] and [7].
2To this regard, remarkable contributions are [9] and [33].
3To this regard see, for instance, [28], [18], [24] and [2]. These works are mainly focused on the
interplay between environmental standards and trade, addressing, in most of the cases, the question of
how standards are handled by countries’ governments in light of their associated trade effects. Here, the
research has been largely motivated by the social and environmental concern about the trade-induced
race-to-the-bottom in the environmental regulation of sovereign states.
4Our model includes a very simple modelisation of environmental awareness, which, however, is rem-
iniscent of previous important contributions such as [8]. Other important related contributions are [30],
[5], [35], [11], [26], [3] and [12].
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good.
Our model is therefore suitable for investigating some crucial questions. Is, in this
context, trade liberalisation raising or lowering the world welfare? Does free trade entail
symmetric or asymmetric environmental effects? Does environmental awareness play any
role? Do countries actually recur to trade policies? How much are these policies dis-
tortionary? Can trade liberalisation deliver both the social and the environmental first
best?
Moreover, our setup fits the purpose of approaching two additional relevant issues.
The first one concerns the role of asymmetric information, which is central in the strategic
approach to international trade.5
If the emission intensity (i.e., the magnitude of the negative environmental external-
ity) is private information, we can suppose that governments may cheat on its level.
Depending on other conditions, in fact, the trade agreements may involve side pay-
ments/compensations in favour of the countries which lose from trade liberalisation. Thus,
if we suppose that trade impacts on welfare also throught the environment, cheating on
the level of trade-induced environmental effects may condition the opening of trade bar-
riers and/or may affect countries’ free trade equilibrium welfare. Moreover, as underlined
by [25], overreporting losses may cause the persistency of distortionary policies: policy
makers of the ”winning” country do not drop such policies as they would incur the risk
of overcompensating the losers.
The second issue is the role of trade in the diffusion of green technologies. This point
is widely recognized in the literature: free trade promotes efficiency in production (i.e.
the reduction of energy use per unit of output) which entails the replacement of old, high-
polluting plants. The development of green (clean) production technologies and their
adoption by polluting industries is usually considered as a long-run effect of trade openess
since it is supposed to emerge at late stages of a coutry’s economic development.
However, this issue has almost ever been tackled from the point of view of environ-
mental regulation: trading nations may come under internal or external (international)
pressure to either adopt or tighten environmental standards, and environmental regulation
stimulates green technology innovation and/or the adoption of existing green technologies
by existing firms.6
We tackle the problem by assuming that countries’ governments can trade in technol-
ogy in order to maximise the welfare of their respective countries. In our model, who buys
technology reduces the potential environmental damage, by lowering the emission inten-
sity of national brown good’s consumption. In other words, we do not model any firms’
compliance behaviour to green production standards: when governments buy technology,
they freely transfer it to national firms or, equivalently, they directly use it to abate emis-
sions7 or to mitigate the negative environmental effects of production. We adopt such an
assumption since we want to focus as clearly as possible on the interplay between trade in
technology, trade liberalisation in the Hotelling-style differentiated good and asymmetric
information on the emission intensity. In particular, we ask whether governments’ incen-
tives to transfer technology may be compromised by rent-seeking motives associated with
5See, for instance, [4], [27], [17], [10] and [22].
6To this regards, [19], [31], [29], [21] and [13].
7For instance, by directly intervening in the national power sector.
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trade flows and the resulting environmental consequences.
Our framework delivers clearcut results. First of all, taking the environment into
account naturally fosters trade integration rather than preventing it. As a consequence,
free trade occurs with no need of accompanying policies.8
Second, the world social welfare is maximised in correspondence of the green autarky,
where the environmental effect of consumption is null in both countries and national firms,
whether green or brown, behave as monopolists. Accordingly, trade liberalisation is always
a second best equilibrium. Third, asymmetric information on the relevant environmental
parameter rules out the use of any possible distortionary trade policy (the government of
the larger country may adopt a distortionary import tariff in order to avoid the risk of
not being adequately compensated for the loss suffered in free trade, thus lowering overall
welfare).
Finally, while trade in the green technology always enforces the attainment of world’s
social welfare first best level, which coincides with green autarky, asymmetric information
always prevents the brown country from buying green technology, thereby necessarily
enforcing a second best equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model,
the autarkic equilibrium and the the effects of trade liberalisation. Section 3 shows how
different trade policies affect the long run social welfare of both countries. Section 4
considers whether asymmetric information on the level of emissions dampens the overall
equilibrium social welfare. Section 5 introduces a market for the green technology and
endogenise the emisison level. Section 6 sums up our analysis.
2 The model, autarky and free trade
Our setup is as follows. Two firms operate in a linear world of unit length where firm 1 is
located in country 1 and firm 2 in country 2. Consumers are uniformly distributed over
[0, 1] with density 1 and a share α of them belongs to country 1 while the complement to 1
belongs to country 2. Since α is to be intended as the border, asymmetry in country sizes
is assured by limiting it to the interval (0, 1/2) so that country 1 is smaller than country
2. A constant marginal cost of production is common to both firms9 and no relocation
costs are modeled. In order to take the negative environmental externality into account,
we also model a linear damage function, such that country i’s social welfare is reduced by
an amount Di which is equal to:
Di = βy2i with i = 1, 2, (2.1)
where y2i is country i’s total consumption of the brown good produced by firm 2 while
β ∈ [0, 1] represents the emission intensity. In both countries, each consumer has a unit
8Our setup can be contrasted with [16] that analyze a similar case in which free trade without accom-
panying trade policies is undoubtedly detrimental at the world level, both from the environmental and
the social point of view. In that case, in fact, (i) trade always implies an increase in the consumption
of a brown good and (ii) a decrease of the importing country’s social welfare not counterbalanced by
an increase in the exporting country’s one. At the same time, an export subsidy for the firm producing
the green variety may turn the overall welfare balance positive, provided that the negative externality
stemming from the consumption of the brown good is high enough.
9Here assumed to be nil without loss of generality.
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demand and consumption yields a constant positive surplus s. Net utility, however, may or
may not account for pollution, depending on the location of a specific consumer. Consider
first an individual based in country 2. For him/her, net utility is defined as:
U2 = s− td2i − pi, i = 1, 2, (2.2)
where pi is the price of variety i and td
2
i is the transportation cost, quadratic in distance
di from firm i. The distance is defined as:
di = m− xi, (2.3)
where m and xi are, respectively, the generic consumer’s and firm i’s locations.
Looking instead at the environmentally concerned consumer, which is necessarily based
in country 1, the corresponding net surplus is defined as:
U1 = s− td2i − pi −D1, i = 1, 2, (2.4)
where D1 = 0 in autarky. For the sake of simplicity, and without further loss of generality,
we also normalize the transportation cost rate t to one while the total transportation costs
in each country write as:
TCj1 =
ˆ m̂j
0
(d1)
2dm; TCj2 =
ˆ 1
m¯
(d2)
2dm (2.5)
where j = A, T whether we refer to the autarkic or to the free trade equilibrium. In (2.5)
m̂j identifies the location of the marginal consumer and writes as mˆA = α in autarky and
mˆT in free trade. Transportation costs of course also appear in the definition of consumer
surpluses:
CSj1 =
ˆ m̂j
0
[s− p1 − (d1)2]dm; CSj2 =
ˆ 1
m̂j
[s− p2 − (d2)2]dm. (2.6)
In autarky, the monopoly price set by each firm nullifies the net surplus Ui of the marginal
consumers, i.e., those living at country borders 0, α or 1:
pA1 = s− (α− xA1 )2; pA2 = s− (1− xA2 )2, (2.7)
where the socially optimal locations are xA1 = α/2 and x
A
2 = (α+ 1)/2. As for free trade,
according to [16], the position of the indifferent consumer is
mˆT =
pT1 − pT2 + (xT1 )2 − (xT2 )2
2(xT1 − xT2 )
(2.8)
which is independent of emission intensity β. That is, since consumers in country 2 incor-
porate the environmental externality irrespectively of their consumption choice (whether
green or brown), the volume of firm 1’s exports to country 2 is unaffected by the environ-
mental awareness of the recipients.
Accordingly, the two-stage subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies coincides
with [20], with maximum differentiation at xT1 = 0, x
T
2 = 1, equilibrium prices and profits
pT1 = p
T
2 = t = 1, pi
T
1 = pi
T
2 =
t
2
= 1
2
and mˆT =
1
2
.
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Note that, since green consumers do not suffer from the externality while brown ones
by definition disregard it, consumer surplus is defined as in (2.6), and the externality
caused by firm 2’s activity is accounted for in the definition of country 2’s welfare (that
is, one needs to suppose that country 2’s government takes into account the externality
although its citizens do not):
SW j1 = pi
j
1 + CS
j
1; SW
j
2 = pi
j
2 + CS
j
2 − β(1− m¯). (2.9)
Also observe that while the social welfare of country 2 is negatively affected by the con-
sumption of the brown good (yj22 = 1 − m¯), this does not affect the social welfare of
country 1 (since the externality is generated by consumption, no transboundary pollution
is supposed to exist). Moreover, in autarky, non negativity of both prices requires impos-
ing a condition on the level of gross consumer surplus common to all consumers, which
is:
s ≥ sAp =
1
4
[1 + α(α− 2)] . (2.10)
Under free trade, no additional condition on s, α, β is required to ensure the non-negativity
of prices and profits while a new condition on gross surplus must hold in order for full
market coverage to be sustainable, i.e.,
s ≥ sTMC =
1
4
(5 + 2β), (2.11)
where
sTMC > s
A
p ∀α ∈ (0, 1/2), β ∈ (0, 1), (2.12)
so that the condition for market coverage in the long run also assures non-negativity of
prices in autarky.
We refer the reader interested in the details of all the magnitudes relative to the
autarkic and free trade cases to Appendices A.1 and A.2, and move forward to depict
the framework of gain and losses stemming from the opening to trade. To this regard,
the following propositions summarise how trade liberalisation affects the social welfare in
both countries.
Proposition 1 [Welfare] Trade liberalisation causes (i) an increase in the welfare of the
smaller country if the latter is sufficiently small, (ii) a decrease in the welfare of the
larger country, (iii) an increase in the welfare at the world level for sufficently small α
and sufficiently high β.
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1 is sufficient to observe that:
SW T1 − SWA1 =
1
4
[
2− α (4 + α2)] > 0 iff α ∈ (0, 0.4735) (2.13)
while, for what concerns part (ii)
SW T2 − SWA2 =
1
4
[
α
(
3 + α + α2 − 4β)− 2(1− β)] (2.14)
which is strictly negative over the admissible range of parameters α and β. As to part
(iii), the welfare differential at the world level is:
6
SW T − SWA = 1
4
[α(α− 4β − 1) + 2β] > 0 iff α ∈ (0, 0.4385), α(1− α)
2− 4α < β < 1,
(2.15)
where SW j is social welfare at the world level.
Proposition 1 thus implies that, when the polluting good is produced in the larger country,
trade liberalisation may be, per se, welfare improving at the world level.
The elementary intuition for this result is that, if the brown firm is based in the
larger country and the position of the indifferent consumer under trade liberalisation is
independent of the location of the brown production, then free trade implies that the
green firm necessarily penetrates the larger country and therefore some consumers in the
latter have access to the green good. This reshuﬄing of aggregate demand at the world
level in favour of the green variety reduces global pollution and opens the way to a welfare
increase at the world level.
Figure 1 presents a picture of the parameter space defined above, where ∆SWA,Ti
indicates the value of the social welfare differential from the autarkic equilibrium to the
free trade equilibrium in country i.
[Figure 1 about here]
Hence, since free trade is unambiguously detrimental for the larger country (regardless
of size asymmetry and emission intensity), opening its frontiers to trade is a strictly
dominated strategy for the latter. Notwithstanding this, in case the gain in social welfare
for the smaller country is high enough to compensate for the loss borne by the larger one,
trade liberalisation is likely to occur when allowing for side payments.
In a supergame played over an infinite horizon, this problem could be effectively solved
to generate a Pareto-efficient outcome. Applying the perfect folk theorem as in [15], the
relevant condition is:
1
1− δ (∆SW
A,T
1 − Tr1,2) ≥ ∆SWA,T1 +
δ
1− δSW
A
1 , (2.16)
where Tr1,2 is the required side payment from country 1 to country 2. It is straightforward
to show that (2.16) requires
δ ≥ δˆ1 = Tr1,2
SW T1 − 2SWA1
. (2.17)
Condition (2.17) reveals that SW T1 < 2SW
A
1 suffices to ensure the sustainability of the
Pareto-efficient equilibrium outcome at the subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame.
The latter condition is trivially shown to hold for each α, β and s > 3−6α−α
3
6α
.
The analysis of trade liberalisation effects on the social welfare also suggests the fol-
lowing:
Proposition 2 [Social and Environmental First Best] For any size of the smaller coun-
try, (i) the highest possible social welfare at the world level is met when the emission
intensity is null, and (ii) trade liberalisation never maximises overall social welfare.
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Proof. In order to prove the first part of the proposition it is sufficient to observe
that, from (2.15), the derivatives with respect to β of both SWA and SW T
SWA
∂β
= α− 1; SW
T
∂β
= −1
2
, (2.18)
are strictly negative for all α ∈ (0, 1/2). Moreover, (2.18), together with (2.15), implies
the second claim in the proposition.
Proposition 2 entails that the maximum social welfare is necessarily found in corre-
spondence of the green autarkic equilibrium. This proves the existence, at the world level,
of a trade-off between the environmental condition and the benefits of trade liberalisation.
The beneficial effects of free trade are, in fact, to be exclusively imputed to the reduction
of negative environmental externalities due to the penetration of the green firm 1 in the
domestic market of country 2. As a consequence, the highest possible gain from trade
liberalisation calls for β = 1, where the environmental damage is maximum. In the same
way, as far as the emission intensity β tends to zero, thus nullifying the environmental
impact of consumption, autarky becomes the world first best social equilibrium.
3 Trade policies
This section describes the effects of trade liberalisation in the case in which the two
country governments can effectively implement some stylised trade policy instruments.
To this regard, our task is to ascertain whether the latter are bound to (i) expand/restrict
the portion of the parameter range in which trade liberalisation is feasible and (ii) distort
(lower) the world equilibrium welfare level. As the free trade marginal consumer is always
a citizen of country 2, country 1 never has the incentive to restrict imports, which are
always null. As a consequence, we limit our analysis to the three following trade policies:
an emission tax on imports levied by the government of country 2 and an export subsidy
which alternatively applies to the goods produced by firm 1 or 2. The subsidy is supposed
to be financed by a decrease in welfare, while tax revenues are supposed to directly accrue
to the social welfare of country 2. In the following, we first focus on the two options at
country 2 government’s disposal and then on country 1’s government.
3.1 Imposing a tariff on firm 1’s sales
If country 2’s government levies a tariff τ > 0 on the volume of the imported green variety,
the profits of firm 1 are lowered by an amount equal to τ(mˆTτ − α) and then write as
piTτ1 = p
Tτ
1 mˆTτ − τ(mˆTτ − α), (3.1)
where Tτ stands for trade with tariff. The social welfare of country 2 is supposed to be
augmented by an amount equal to the gross tariff income:
SW Tτ2 = pi
Tτ
2 + CS
Tτ
2 − β(1− mˆTτ ) + τ(mˆTτ − α). (3.2)
Any change occur in the definition of all other magnitudes with respect to the free trade
case previously described. The equilibrium arising is such that xTτ1 = 0 and x
Tτ
2 = 1,
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implying the following marginal consumer’s equilibrium location:
mˆTτ =
3− τ
6
(3.3)
while equilibrium prices are pTτ1 = 1 +
2τ
3
; : pTτ2 =
3+τ
3
.10 From the condition of non
negativity of country 2’s imports (mˆTτ − α > 0) we can derive the maximum admissible
level of the tariff τ :11
τ¯ = 3− 6α. (3.4)
The objective function of the government of country 2 is then:
max
τ
SW Tτ2 s.t. τ < τ¯ , (3.5)
which yields:
τ ∗ = 2(1− α)− β ∀ α ∈ (0, 1/2), β ∈ (max[0, 4α− 1], 1). (3.6)
For τ = τ ∗ the marginal consumer locates at:
mˆ∗Tτ =
1 + 2α + β
6
. (3.7)
Thus, from (3.4) and (3.6), it follows that, for β ∈ (0,max[0, 4α − 1]), country 2’s gov-
ernment cannot implement τ ∗, since τ ∗ > τ¯ ; it will then necessarily choose a sub-optimal
tariff τ = τ¯ in order to maximize social welfare. The expressions of other equilibrium
magnitudes for τ = τ ∗ are reported in B.1. Focusing on the social welfare effects of trade
liberalisation in the presence of the optimal tariff τ ∗, we can state what follows:
Proposition 3 [Welfare withTariff] If size asymmetry and the emission intensity are both
sufficiently high, the optimal tariff delivers social welfare gains with respect to autarky for
both countries.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition it is sufficient to observe that:
SW Tτ2 − SWA2 =
1
12
[
α(1 + 7α + 3α2)− β(8α + β − 2)− 2] > 0 (3.8)
iff β ∈
(
min
[
β˜, 1
]
, 1
)
where β˜ = 4α− 1 +√3(1− α)3, while
SW Tτ1 − SWA1 =
1
36
[
2 (1 + β)2 − 4α (1 + β)− α2 (16 + 9α)] > 0 (3.9)
iff α ∈ (0, 0.239) , β ∈ (0, 1)
and α ∈ (0.239, 0.5) , β ∈
(
min
[
α− 1 + 3
√
α2 (2 + α)√
2
, 1
]
, 1
)
.
10While the non negativity of both prices is always verified, full market coverage is now ensured if
gross consumer surplus is greater than sTτMC =
1
36
(
45 + 18τ + τ2
)
, where, again, sTτMC > s
A
p : ∀α ∈
(0, 1/2), β ∈ (0, 1), τ > 0.
11For each τ > τ¯ , the model thus predicts a reversal of trade flows with mˆTτ < α. This would formally
translate the tariff into a subsidy for firm 2, which, clearly, is not among the feasible policies available to
country 2’s government, and would invalidate the definition of the demand system.
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Hence, the parameter range in which both countries gain from trade liberalisation neces-
sarily coincides with the one in (3.8), while concerning social welfare at the world level
we have that:
SW Tτ − SWA = 1
36
[
5α2 − 4 + 5β(2 + β)− α(1 + 28β)] > 0 (3.10)
iff α ∈ (0, 0.4) , β ∈
(
14α− 5 + 3√5 + α(19α− 5)
5
, 1
)
Figure 2 offers a picture of the parameters ranges described above.
[Figure 2 about here]
The foregoing discussion leads the following proposition:
Proposition 4 [Tariff] . The optimal tariff τ ∗ never succeeds in raising the overall free
trade social welfare.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition it suffices to recall the definitions of the
overall social welfare differentials with respect to autarky (2.15) and (3.10) and show that
∆SW Tτ −∆SW T = 1
36
(2− 2α + 5β) (−2 + 2α + β) (3.11)
which is strictly negative over the whole parameter range.
This also has an ancillary but relevant consequence. In the range appearing in (3.8),
country 2 can effectively implement τ ∗ as a credible threat in order to extract surplus from
country 1, i.e., raising the minimum transfer level necessary to enforce trade liberalisation
in the case described in the preceding section. In that case, in fact, the minimum transfer
level from country 1 to country 2 is
TrT1,2 = −∆SWA,T2 (3.12)
which is equal to the loss suffered by country 2 in free trade. The tariff allows country 2
to ask for (3.12) to be increased, at most, by the positive amount ∆SWA,Tτ2 such that:
TrTτ1,2 = −∆SWA,T2 + ∆SWA,Tτ2 = SW Tτ2 − SW T2 =
(2α + β − 2)2
12
(3.13)
This also implies that the maximum transfer decreases, from ∆SWA,T1 to
Tr
Tτ
1,2 = ∆SW
A,T
1 −∆SWA,Tτ1 =
(4α− β − 4) (2α + β − 2)
18
. (3.14)
Since in β ∈
(
min
[
4α− 1 +√3(1− α)3, 1] , 1) it is always verified that TrTτ1,2 > TrTτ1,2,
so that there always exists an interval TrTτ1,2 < Tr < Tr
Tτ
1,2 in which country 2 does not
implement the Pigouvian tax on imports τ ∗. As a consequence, irrespective of the fact
that it may or not be credibly implemented by the government of country 2, the optimal
tariff policy is strictly distortionary, in that it always delivers a lower overall social welfare
with respect to the free trade equilibrium.
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3.2 Subsidising firm 2’s sales
The second policy option for the government of country 2 is a subsidy θ2 > 0 to firm 2 for
each of the α − mˆTθ units of brown good export to country 1. The subsidy is obviously
defined for all mˆ− α < 0, that is, if the marginal consumer is located in country 1.12 In
this case, the profits of firm 2 become:
piTθ22 = p
Tθ2
2 mˆTθ + θ2(α− mˆTθ2) (3.15)
where superscript Tθ2 stands for trade with subsidy for firm 2. Accordingly, countries’
social welfare functions write as
SW Tθ21 = pi
Tθ2
1 +CS
Tθ2
1 −β(α−mˆTθ2); SW Tθ22 = piTθ22 +CSTθ22 −β(1−α)−θ2(α−mˆTθ2)
(3.16)
From (3.16), equilibrium social welfare of country 2 is supposed to be reduced by an
amount equal to the subsidy enjoyed by firm 2. Moreover, the externality now also hurts
country 1’s social welfare, since a part of consumers switches to the brown good produced
by firm 2. Again, the resulting equilibrium is such that xTθ21 = 0 and x
Tθ2
2 = 1, implying
the following marginal consumer’s equilibrium location:
mˆTθ2 =
3− θ2
6
(3.17)
which is obviously decreasing in θ2, while equilibrium prices are p
Tθ2
1 = 1− θ23 and pTθ22 =
1 − 2θ2
3
. Note that both prices are decreasing in θ, because the subsidy strengthens the
price competition stemming from trade liberalisation. This obviously happens since firm
2 can now sustain a lower price. From the non-negativity condition on country 1’s imports
(mˆTθ − α < 0) we can derive the minimum level of θ:
θ2 = 3(1− 2α) (3.18)
while the non-negativity of both prices is now verified for θ2 ∈
(
0, 3
2
]
. The latter condition,
togheter with (3.18), implies that the subsidy policy is necessarily restricted to the range
α ∈ (1/4, 1/2) because for values of α below 1/4 the minimum subsidy θ2 exceeds 3/2.13
The maximisation of social welfare by country 2’s government then yields
θ∗2 = 2(1− α) ∀ α ∈ (1/4, 1/2), β ∈ (0, 1) (3.19)
and for θ2 = θ
∗
2 the marginal consumer locates at:
mˆ∗Tθ2 =
1 + 2α
6
. (3.20)
If the Government of country 2 provides firm 2 with a θ∗2 subsidy, we can state what
follows:
12Note that, according to [16], this also implies that the demand system has to be defined anew, in
order to account for the trade flow reversal. Nonetheless, this has no consequences on the definition of
the marginal consumer’s location which is again (2.8).
13Full market coverage is now assured if consumer surplus is greater than sTθ2MC =
1
36 [9(5− 2β + 4αβ)− θ(18− 6β − θ)] , where sTθ2MC > sAp ∀ α ∈ (1/4, 1/2), β ∈ (0, 1), θ ∈ (0, 3/2).
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Proposition 5 [Welfare with Subsidy C2] The long-run effect of trade liberalisation on
social welfare consists in: (i) an increase in the welfare of the larger country if the asym-
metry in size is sufficiently small, and (ii) a decrease in the welfare the smaller country
as well as global welfare, irrespective of size asymmetry and emission intensity.
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1, it suffices to observe that, for
θ2 = θ
∗
2, α ∈ (1/4, 1/2) and β ∈ (0, 1):
SWTθ22 − SWA2 =
(2 + α)(α + 3α2 − 1)
12
> 0 iff α ∈
(√
13− 1
6
' 0.434, 1/2
)
(3.21)
while, concerning part (ii), we have:
SWTθ21 − SWA1 =
1
36
{2 + 30β − α [4 + α(16 + 9α)]} (3.22)
SWTθ2 − SWA = 1
36
[α(5α− 24β − 1) + 6β − 4] (3.23)
both strictly negative over the whole parameter range.
The last claim in Proposition 5 tells us that in our setup, an optimal subsidy is al-
ternatively a not credible or ineffective threat from country 1’s standpoint. In fact, for
all α ∈ (0.434, 0.5), country 2 may always credibly announce to implement the policy,
altough it is clear that she cannot offer a sufficiently large side-payment to country 1’s
government in order to enforce trade liberalisation. This happens since the subsidy policy
always hurts the social welfare at the world level, as compared to autarky. As a con-
sequence, the threat of adopting an optimal subsidy policy is fully equivalent to closing
barriers.
It remains to be formally checked if also the subsidy is distortionary:
Proposition 6 [Subsidy C2] . The optimal subsidy θ∗2 is always outperformed by the
optimal tariff τ ∗.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition, observe that, from (B.1) and (B.2):
∆SW Tτ,Tθ2 = SW Tθ2 − SW Tτ = 1
36
β (4α− 5β − 4) (3.24)
which is strictly negative over the relevant parameter range α ∈ (1/4, 1/2). Finally, taking
into account Proposition 4, we can write
SW Tθ2 < SW Tτ < SW T .
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3.3 Subsidising firm 1’s sales
Although the government of country 1 has no incentive to design a tariff policy, it may
always susbsidise its own firm. To this regard, we suppose that it may adopt a subsidy
θ1 > 0, formally identical to the one described in Section 3.2. The price incentive is now
provided to firm 1 for each of the mˆ− α units of green good export to country 2. In this
case, firm 1’s profits become:
piTθ11 = p
Tθ1
1 mˆTθ1 + θ1(α− mˆTθ1) (3.25)
where Tθ1 stands for trade with subsidy for firm 1. Accordingly, countries’ social welfare
functions now write as
SW Tθ11 = pi
Tθ1
1 + CS
Tθ1
1 − θ1(mˆTθ1 − α); SW Tθ12 = piTθ12 + CSTθ12 − β(1− mˆTθ1) (3.26)
The long run again entails the usual (0; 1) equilibrium locations of firm 1 and 2 while, in
this case we have
mˆTθ1 =
3 + θ1
6
; pTθ11 = 1−
2θ1
3
; pTθ12 = 1−
θ1
3
; θ1 = 3(1− 2α) (3.27)
and non-negativity of both prices is verified for θ1 ∈
(
0, 3
2
]
, the subsidy being defined in
the same parametric range as in section 3.2, α ∈ (1/4; 1/2). 14 The optimal equilibrium
subsidy
θ∗1 =
3(4α− 1)
4
∀ α ∈ (1/4, 1/2), β ∈ (0, 1) (3.28)
now entails the following marginal consumer’s location
mˆ∗Tθ1 =
3 + 4α
8
. (3.29)
If indeed the Government of country 1 provides firm 1 with subsidy θ∗1, we can state:
Proposition 7 [Welfare with Subsidy C1] The long-run effect of trade liberalisation on
social welfare consists in: (i) an increase in the welfare of the smaller country, (ii) a
increase in the welfare the larger country if size asymmetry is sufficiently low and emission
intensity is sufficiently high, and (iii) an increase in the social welfare at the world level
if emission intensity is high enough.
Proof. Part (i) of Proposition 1 is holds because, for θ1 = θ
∗
1, α ∈ (1/4, 1/2) and
β ∈ (0, 1),
SWTθ11 − SWA1 =
9− 4α [α (α− 4) + 6]
16
> 0 (3.30)
for all α ∈ (1/4, 1/2), β ∈ (0, 1). Part (ii) relies on
SWTθ12 − SWA2 =
8α [2α (α− 4) + 11− 4β]− 37 + 24β
64
> 0
iff α ∈ (0.386, 1/2) , β ∈ (β, 1) (3.31)
14Full market coverage is now ensured if consumer surplus is greater than sTθ1MC =
1
36
(
45− 18θ + θ2) ,
where, again, sTθ1MC > s
A
p : ∀ α ∈ (1/4, 1/2), β ∈ (0, 1), θ1 ∈ (0, 3/2).
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where β = 8α[2α(α−4)+11]−37
8(4α−3) . Part (iii) is proved by
SWTθ1 − SWA = 24β − 8α (1 + 4β)− 1
64
> 0 iff β ∈
(
1 + 8α
8 (3− 4α) , 1
)
. (3.32)
Then, differently from θ∗2, θ
∗
1 may also be beneficial for country 2 since it strengthens
the positive green export effect of trade liberalisation. The range in which both countries
gain from trade liberalisation is therefore compatible with a Nash bargaining solution.
We will henceforth refer to this equilibrium as Tθ1b, where the b stands for bargaining.
Figure 3 summarises the claims in Proposition 7
[Figure 3 about here]
Moreover, the comparison with the other scenarios previously described along the
world social welfare dimension delivers the following result:
Proposition 8 [Subsidy C1]. The optimal subsidy θ∗1 raises the overall free trade social
welfare for sufficiently low levels of size asimmetry and emission intensity.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition it is sufficient to observe that, from (B.1)
and (B.3):
∆SW T,Tθ1 = SW Tθ1 − SW T = (4α− 1) (1− 4α + 8β)
64
> 0
iff α ∈ (0.25, 0.5) , β ∈
(
0,
4α− 1
8
)
. (3.33)
3.4 Discussion
Having described the welfare effects of the three different trade policies, we may now
provide a comprehensive picture of the feasible equilibria in the space (α, β). First of
all, note that, in the range α ∈ (0.25, 0.5), β ∈ (4α− 1, 1), the government of country 2
can indeed choose between an optimal tariff and an optimal subsidy. To this regard, and
taking into account only the welfare of country 2, the subsidy outperforms the tariff for
sufficiently low emission intensity or sufficiently low asimmetry in size. In fact, by (B.1)
and (B.2), we see that
∆SW Tτ,Tθ22 = SW
Tθ2
2 − SW Tτ2 =
β (8α− 2− β)
12
> 0
iff α ∈ (0.25, 0.375) , β ∈ (4α− 1, 8α− 2)
or α ∈ (0.375, 0.5) , β ∈ (4α− 1, 1) (3.34)
However, (3.34), although necessary, is not sufficient to prefer the subsidy to the tariff
as this would require two more conditions to simultaneously hold. First, both policies
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must be credible, that is, they must generate a country’s welfare gain with respect to its
autarkic equilibrium level. Second, country 2’s gain must go along with an overall welfare
gain, so that, alternatively, either (i) both countries gain from trade liberalisation or (ii)
a side-payment to country 1 is feasible.
The first of the two conditions is met only by the subsidy. In fact, as one may ascertain
by looking at Proposition 3 and 5, only the subsidy grants the larger country a welfare
gain with respect to autarky, in the range α ∈ (0.434, 0.5), β ∈ (4α− 1, 1), while the tariff
necessarily implies a loss.
The second condition holds instead only for the tariff. Note, in fact, that in the region
α ∈ (0.25, 0.4), β ∈
([
14α− 5 + 3
√
5 + α(19α− 5)
]
/5, 1
)
the tariff exerts a positive effect on the overall welfare with respect to its autakic level,
while the subsidy does not.
As a result, in the range α ∈ (0.25, 0.5), β ∈ (4α− 1, 1) country 2 will not consider to
implement a trade policy since it cannot extract any additional surplus from country 1,
to raise the minimum transfer offered by country 1 in order to enforce trade liberalisation.
Similar arguments hold for the range α ∈ (0, 0.25) , β ∈
(
0,min
[
β˜, 1
])
where the sole
policy option for country 2’s government is the optimal tariff τ ∗. In that case, the tariff
never meets the first of the two above conditions. Consequently, the case in which the
tariff may be effective in raising the free trade country 2’s welfare is limited to the range
α ∈ (0, 0.176) , β ∈
(
β˜, 1
)
.
As to the optimal subsidy θ∗1, nothing prevents country 1 from adopting it in the
range α ∈ (1/4, 1/2) in which it is feasible, except the fact that it cannot raise the world
welfare with respect to its autarkic level. According to Proposition 7, this happens for
α ∈ (0.25, 0.5) , β ∈
(
0, 1+8α
8(3−4α)
)
. Comparing (2.15) and (3.32), we may thus conclude
that the subsidy further expands the range in which free trade is beneficial for the global
economy. Moreover, according to Proposition 8, in the same range the subsidy delivers
the highest possible world welfare, so that it is not a distortionary policy.
Finally, note that the claims in Proposition 2 still hold when free trade is accompanied
by a subsidy policy: also for α > 1/4 in fact, the highest social welfare is attained at the
green autarkic equilibrium.
Figure 1 resumes the results so far described. In the figure, we identify four areas,
each one being identified by the appropriate label.
[Figure 4 about here]
Free trade without any accompanying policy is thus optimal for a limited parameter
range. As the asymmetry in size between the two countries decreases, we observe an
expansion of the range of β in which the autarkic equilibrium is optimal at the world level.
The larger country 1, the greater the green share of the differentiated good consumed at
the world level and the lower the environmental benefits of free trade.
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4 Asymmetric information on β
The analysis in Section 3 is based on the hypotesis that the information on the emission
intensity β is common knowledge for the two governments. If this is the case, we have
shown that, whenever trade is enforceable, the equilibrium welfare of the two countries,
after side-payments, crucially depens on (i) the value of the intertemporal discount rate δ
of country 1 in (2.16) and (ii) the feasibility of a tariff policy adopted by country 2, which
would necessarily raise the minimum side-payment TrT1,2.
Suppose now that only the government of country 2 is able to observe the real extent
of the environmental damage suffered by its own inhabitants. This implies that this
government may report a fictitious value βˆ of the emission intensity, so that it faces the
following maximisation problem
max
βˆ
ŜW2
i
s.t. βˆ > β¯, (3.35)
The maximand ŜW2
i
is the ex-post welfare level of country 2, defined as
ŜW2
i
= SW j2 + T̂R
i
1,2, (3.36)
where superscripts i, j = T, Tτ, Tθ1, T θ1b identify the ranges to which the declared emis-
sion level βˆ and the real level β belong. Accordingly, the payment made by country 1
takes the values15
T̂R
i
1,2 =

T̂R
T
1,2 = SW
A
2
(
βˆ
)
− SW T2
(
βˆ
)
∀ α ∈ (0, 14) , βˆ ∈ (β¯,min [β˜, 1])
TrTτ1,2
(
βˆ
)
∀ α ∈ (0, 0.176) , βˆ ∈
(
β˜, 1
)
T̂R
Tθ1
1,2 = SW
A
2
(
βˆ
)
− SW Tθ12
(
βˆ
)
∀ α ∈ (14 , 12) , βˆ ∈ (β¯,min [β, 1])
T̂R
Tθ1b
1,2 =
∆SWA,Tθ1(βˆ)
2 −∆SWA,Tθ12
(
βˆ
)
∀ α ∈ (0.386, 12) , βˆ ∈ (β, 1)
(3.37)
Finally, the lower bound of β¯ in the constraint writes as
β¯ =
{
α(1−α)
2−4α iff α < 1/4
1+8α
8(3−4α) iff α > 1/4
(3.38)
that is, βˆ must necessarily lie in the range for which free trade (either regime T or Tθ1)
delivers an increase in the overall social welfare. Note that in the first and third case
in (3.37) the transfer writes as (3.12) while, in the second one, writes as (3.13). The
fourth case corresponds to the area in which both countries gain from trade liberalisation
when the government of country 1 chooses to subsidy its firm. As a consequence, this
parameter range is compatible with a Nash bargaining solution and the side-payment is
set as to equal the social welfare of country 1 to the declared social welfare of country 2.
The behaviour of country 2’s governments, i.e., the optimal value of the declared emission
intensity βˆ∗ is summarised in the following proposition:
15In the following we suppose that the effective transfer is equivalent to the minimum transfer Tr1,2.
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Proposition 9 [Asymmetric information]. In the presence of aysmmetric information
on the real level of emission intensity β, country 2’s government always reports the min-
imum value of β compatible with trade liberalisation, i.e. βˆ = β¯.
Proof. The proof of the proposition requires to solve the maximisation problem
of (3.35) for each of the cases in (3.37). Let’s first consider the case α ∈ (0, 1
4
)
, βˆ ∈(
β¯,min
[
β˜, 1
])
, then, from (3.35), (3.37), (A.1) and (A.2) we have that
ŜW
T
2 = SW
T
2 + SW
A
2
(
βˆ
)
− SW T2
(
βˆ
)
=
12s (1− α)− 1− 6
(
βˆ + β
)
+ α
[
3 + α (α− 3) + 12βˆ
]
12
, (3.39)
where
∂ŜW
T
2
∂βˆ
=
2α− 1
2
which is independent from the real emission intensity β and strictly negative over α ∈
(0, 1/2). Accordingly, the maximisation of (3.39) with respect to βˆ necessarily yields
βˆ∗ = β¯. In the second case in (3.37), the government of country 2 may credibly implement
a tariff policy, thus raising its minimum side payment to the level TrTτ1,2. This implies that
(3.36) now writes as
ŜW
Tτ
2 = SW
T
2 + Tr
Tτ
1,2 = SW
T
2 + SW
Tτ
2
(
βˆ
)
− SW T2
(
βˆ
)
=
12s (1− α)− 3 + 4α (1 + α + α2)− βˆ
(
4− 4α− βˆ
)
− 6β
12
, (3.40)
where
∂ŜW
Tτ
2
∂βˆ
=
2α + β − 2
6
which is strictly positive over α ∈ (0, 1/2). In the case in which country 2 undertakes a
tariff policy, this implies that the optimal declared emission intensity is βˆ∗ = 1. Anyway,
the asymmetric information implies that the government of country 2 may effectively
report any value of β ∈ (β¯, 1), that is, even values below the threshold β = β˜. This
would obviously dropping the tariff policy and getting (3.39). The government must then
compare the maximum social welfare with the tariff (ŜW
Tτ
2 |βˆ=1) with the maximum
social welfare without it (ŜW
T
2 |βˆ=β¯). In this respect, from (3.39) and (3.40) we have
that:
ŜW
Tτ
2 |βˆ=1 −ŜW
T
2 |βˆ=β¯ =
α [8 + α (4 + 3α)− 5]
12
, (3.41)
which is strictly negative for all α ∈ (0, 1/4) so that, in this range, the optimal declared
emission intensity is necessarily βˆ∗ = β¯, regardless of the fact the government of country
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2 may or not effectively adopt a tariff policy. The third case in (3.37) entails the following
maximand
ŜW
Tθ1
2 = SW
Tθ1
2 + SW
A
2
(
βˆ
)
− SW Tθ12
(
βˆ
)
=
24s (1− α)− 2− 3
(
3βˆ + 5β
)
+ 2α
[
3 + α (α− 3) + 6
(
βˆ + β
)]
24
, (3.42)
where
∂ŜW
Tθ1
2
∂βˆ
=
4α− 3
8
which is strictly negative over α ∈ (1/4, 1/2), implying, again, βˆ∗ = β¯. It remains to be
checked the last perspective in (3.37):
ŜW
Tθ1b
2 = SW
Tθ1
2 +
∆SWA,Tθ1
(
βˆ
)
2
−∆SWA,Tθ12
(
βˆ
)
=
384s (1− α)− 72βˆ − 5 (7 + 48β) + 8α
[
4α (α− 3) + 3
(
3 + 4βˆ + 8β
)]
384
,
(3.43)
Here, we have that
∂ŜW
Tθ1b
2
∂βˆ
=
4α− 3
16
still strictly negative. As a consequence, in this case, the maximum welfare ŜW2
Tθ1b
will be
in correspondence of βˆ = β which is the bottom threshold under which trade liberalisation
net of the side-payment, entails a loss for country 2. If α < 1/4, the government must
compare ŜW
Tθ1b
2 |βˆ=β with ŜW
Tθ1
2 |βˆ=β. From (3.42) and (3.43)
ŜW
Tθ1b
2 |βˆ=β −ŜW
Tθ1
2 |βˆ=β =
4α [6 + α (α− 4)]− 9
32
, (3.44)
strictly negative for all α ∈ (1/4, 1/2). Therefore, also in this parameter range country 2
always adopts βˆ∗ = β¯.
Proposition 9 has two important implications. First, it tells us that asymmetric infor-
mation on the relevant parameter β rules out any distortionary policy and thus enforces
the optimal equilibrium configuration from the standpoint of the overall social welfare.
This is opposite to the case made by [25] in which distortionary policies persist only as
the optimal response to the information constraint. In their setup, the policymaker which
would win from dropping the distortionary policy, may maintain it in order not to run the
risk of overcompensating the loser. The second important implication has to do instead
with the rent-seeking incentive on the part of country 2 when it cheats on the real value
of the emission intensity. This is one of the aspects debated in the following section.
18
5 Trade in the green technology
In the previous sections we have supposed β to be exogenous. This obviously entails the
fundamental trade-off between trade liberalisation and environmental and social first best,
described in Proposition 2. In the following, we extend the model to encompass tradable
green technology in order to endogenise the equilibrium level of β. To this regard, we
adopt a very simple framework, supposing that green technology is exclusively produced
by (green) country 1’s government at the unitary cost k. Moreover, we can write the
emission intensity after the abatement βa as
βa = f(β, T ) (3.45)
where T represents the amount of green technology bought by country 2. Accordingly,
countries’ gain from abatement can be written as
∂SWi
∂T
=
∂SWi
∂β
· ∂β
∂T
where i = 1, 2. The price of technology (pT ) would then range from the minimum level
represented by the loss/gain incurred by country 1 plus the production cost, to the max-
imum level represented by country 2’s gain from abatement:
∂SW2
∂β
· ∂β
∂T
≥ pT ≥ k + ∂SW1
∂β
· ∂β
∂T
(3.46)
Suppose now that (3.45) assumes the following linear form:
βa = β − γ · T (3.47)
It then follows that 3.46 now writes as:
−γ · ∂SW2
∂β
≥ pT ≥ k − γ · ∂SW1
∂β
(3.48)
∂SW2
∂β
>
∂SW1
∂β
is the necessary condition for a pT > 0 to exist, given an arbitrarily small k. As only the
government of country 2 can influence the level of emission intensity - by buying technology
from country 1 - as a first step we assess its incentives to do so. This amounts to assessing
the dynamics of country 2’s social welfare with respect to β. Trade in technology is
independent from that in the differentiated good, so that the former may also emerge in
the parameter ranges in which autarky is the equilibrium outcome of the model, that is for
β < β¯. Accordingly, the first and fourth parameter range of (3.37) have been re-defined
in (3.49).
∂SW2
∂β
=

α− 1 < 0 ∀ α ∈ (0, 14) , β ∈ (0,min [β˜, 1])
4α+2β−10
12 < 0 ∀ α ∈ (0, 0.176) , β ∈
(
β˜, 1
)
α− 1 < 0 ∀ α ∈ (14 , 12) , β ∈ (0,min [β, 1])
4α−5
16 < 0 ∀ α ∈
(
0.386, 12
)
, β ∈ (β, 1)
(3.49)
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where SW2 is the equilibrium social welfare of country 2. Note that, since the derivative
of SW2 with respect to β is negative irrespective of the level of α and β, country 2 always
benefits from a decrease in the emission intensity. As to country 1, we have that
∂SW1
∂β
=

1
2 − α > 0 ∀ α ∈
(
0, 14
)
, β ∈
(
0,min
[
β˜, 1
])
8(1−α)−β
18 > 0 ∀ α ∈ (0, 0.176) , β ∈
(
β˜, 1
)
3−4α
8 > 0 ∀ α ∈
(
1
4 ,
1
2
)
, β ∈ (0,min [β, 1])
4α−5
16 < 0 ∀ α ∈
(
0.386, 12
)
, β ∈ (β, 1)
(3.50)
which implies that, except for the last case (bargaining with θ1 subsidy), the smaller
country always looses from a decrease in β. From (A.2) and (B.3), the social welfare
of country 1 is independent of the emission intensity, therefore the results in (3.50) are
generated by the change in the transfer to country 2. Moreover, by comparing (3.49) and
(3.50) we have that ∣∣∣∣∂SW2∂β
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∣∂SW1∂β
∣∣∣∣ ∀α, β
Accordingly, there always exists some k > 0 such that country 1 gains from selling green
technology to country 2. If country 1’s government fixes the price pT to the maximum level
−∂SW2
∂β
, in a way it extracts from country 2 the whole additional surplus generated by a
decrease in β, the maximum cost for the green technology writes as k¯ = −
(
∂SW2
∂β
+ ∂SW1
∂β
)
,
so that
k¯ =

1
2
∀ α ∈ (0, 1
4
)
, β ∈
(
0,min
[
β˜, 1
])
7+2(α−β)
8
∀ α ∈ (0, 0.176) , β ∈
(
β˜, 1
)
5−4α
8
∀ α ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
)
, β ∈ (0,min [β, 1])
4α−5
8
∀ α ∈ (0.386, 1
2
)
, β ∈ (β, 1)
(3.51)
and country 1 has the incentive to produce and sell technology if k ∈ (0, k¯). The following
proposition contains the most important implications of what stated so far.
Proposition 10 [Green Technology]. If information is symmetric, green technology is
traded and the production cost of the latter is sufficiently low, then the green autarkic
equilibrium, which corresponds to the world social welfare first best, is always enforced.
Proof. The proof of the proposition with regards to the first and third intervals
in (3.51) is straightforward. In fact, according to (3.49), (3.50) and (3.51), technology
is traded for k ∈ (0,min(1/2, 5−4α
8
)
)
, until the emission intensity of country 2 reaches
the lower bound β¯. As far as country 2 always gets its autarkic equilibrium level of
social welfare, its incentive to reduce emissions remains constant and positive below the
threshold. On the contrary, the loss for country 1 disappears in autarky. As a consequence,
the two countries still trade technology in autarky, for all k ∈
(
0,
∂SWA2
∂β
)
, until β = 0.
Now take the second case in (3.51). Here, country 2 adopts the optimal tariff τ ∗
as a threat, the two countries still have the right incentive to trade technology (for k ∈(
0, 7+2(α−β)
8
)
) and therefore β surely reaches the lower bound β = β˜. However, below this
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threshold it is optimal to drop the tariff and country 2 gets SWA2 . Comparing country
2’s level of the social welfare above and below the threshold then yields
SW Tτ2 |β=β˜ −SWA2 =
(α− 1)
[
12α
√
3 (1− α)3 + α (46 + α)− 11− 12s
]
12
, (3.52)
which is strictly negative, so that we must conclude that country 2 still buys technology
and thus enforces the green autarkic equilibrium.16 Lastly, we consider the case of bar-
gaining with subsidy (Tθ1b). In this specific case, for k ∈
(
0, 4α−5
8
)
, the emission intensity
is necessarily reduced to β¯. Anyway, contrary to the case of tariff, the incentive of country
2 to marginally reduce β below this threshold disappears, as
SW Tθ1b2 |β=β −SWA2 =
219 + 48s [3 + 2α (4α− 5)]− 288β + 2α {2α [123 + α (4α− 45)− 96β] + 336β − 283}
96 (4α− 3)
(3.53)
is strictly positive over
α ∈
(
1
4
,
1
2
)
, β ∈
(
β˘, β
)
(3.54)
where β˘ = 1821−6350α+7752α
2−3696α3+448α4
1152−2688α+1536α2 < β. This would entail that the trade in tech-
nology stops at β = β. However, if this were the case, country 1 would loss the profits
associated to the shift from β˘ to β = 0. It could then freely provide technology to country
2 in order to restore the incentive of the latter. This requires that the total cost of free
technology does not exceed the additional profits for country 1. This is always verified,
since(
SWA2 |β=β˘ −SWA2 |β=0
)
− kβ =
2α [1879− 4α (537− 234α + 8α2)]− 192k {4α [6 + α (α− 4)]− 9} − 1173
384 (4α− 3) (3.55)
is strictly positive for α ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
)
, β ∈ (0, β) and k ∈ (0, 5−4α
8
)
.
However, one may observe that free trade in the differentiated good is not necessary
to prove the claim in proposition 10. In fact, as long as the autarkic social welfare of
country 2 is strictly decreasing in α, while the autarkic social welfare of country 1 is
independent from the emission intensity, there always exists a level of k > 0 such that
countries trade in technology up to β = 0, whatever level of β they start from. Moreover,
this is equivalent to the results in proposition 10 from the point of view of the distribution
of welfare between the two countries, given that country 1 still extracts all the welfare gain
that country 2 obtains from the emission abatement. Accordingly, trade liberalisation in
the differentiated good, although still welfare-maximising both at the single country and
16Note that country 1 undoubtedly benefits from a decrease in β below the threshold, as, dropping the
tariff, the side-payment to country 2 decreases.
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at the overall level, only affects country 1’s internal distribution of welfare. In fact, in
autarky, the consumers and the firm based in 1 may benefit from selling green technology
but this necessarily requires the government’s mediation. Under free trade, part of the
gain is directly accruing to firm 1, as it necessarily penetrates the larger market.
Summing up, the possibility of technology transfer delivers a positive effect on the
overall social welfare which outperforms the analogous effect of asymmetric information
outlined in proposition 9 (when the sole tradable good was the differentiated one). In fact,
while in that case asymmetric information ensures that optimal equilibrium is enforced for
any α and β, the trade in green technology ensures that the world social and environmental
first best is always met.
We may now ask what is the effect of asymmetric information on β in the setup of
this section. This is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 [Asymmetric information and green technology]. If green technology is
tradable and free trade in the differentiated good is an equilibrium, asymmetric information
prevents country 2 to buy green technology.
Proof. Differentiating the ex-post social welfare level of country 217 with respect to
the real value of emission intensity β, we get
∂ŜW 2 |βˆ=β¯
∂β
=
{
−1
2
< 0 ∀ α ∈ (0, 1
4
)
, β ∈ (β, 1)
4α−5
8
< 0 ∀ α ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
)
, β ∈ (β, 1) (3.56)
From (3.56) one can conclude that, whenever trade in the differentiated good is an equilib-
rium, country 2’s governement still has the incentive to buy green technology and reduce
the level of emission intensity to β. However, from (3.49) and (3.56), these incentives are
always weaker if compared to the symmetric information case. This implies that trade
would occur in a narrower range of the unitary cost k, i.e., for all α and β, the cost upper
bound k is necessarily lower. Moreover, since
lim
β→β
ŜW 2 = SW
A
2
we can say that, for any ptech <
∂ŜW 2|βˆ=β¯
∂β
, country 2 always trades its informational rent
for a lower level of the environmental damage. Note that this also implies that the long run
would always entail the green autarkic equilibrium. Once reached the autarkic equilibrium
range, in fact, parameter β does not affect the maximum price level for green technology
(
∂SWA2
∂β
= α−1) anymore so that asymmetric information plays no role. Accordingly, from
Proposition 10, we know that, provided a sufficiently low k, the two countries will go on
trading below the threshold β¯, until β = 0, irrespectively of the level of α.
However, since country 1 does not observe the real level of β, it may set the price
prevailing in the symmetric case, that is ptech = −∂SW2|β=β¯∂β = 1 − α. Country 2 would
then buy technology only if
γ = SWA2 |β=0 −ŜW 2 |βˆ=β¯ −β · ptech (3.57)
is strictly positive. Evaluating (3.57) in the four relevant intervals Tτ, T, Tθ1, T θ1b yields:
17To this regard, see the proof of Proposition 9.
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[Tτ ] γ = 8−28α−13α
2+126α3−81α4−48α5+24β(2α−1)3
48(1−2α)2 < 0
[T ] γ = α−α
2−2β+4αβ
4
< 0
[Tθ1,Tθ1b] γ =
1+6α+8β(4α−3)
64
< 0
which implies the claim in the proposition.
6 Concluding remarks
We have investigated the welfare effect of free trade in a framework of spatial competition
a´ la Hotelling. Our setup combines different features of the models developed in the vast
literature dealing with the interplay between trade and the environment. In particular,
we have outlineed an asymmetric world, where countries’ population size is negatively
correlated to per-capita income and environmental awareness. Accordingly, the larger
among the two countries hosts the only brown firm in the economy and - in autarky
- its inhabitants are the only ones suffering from a negative externality stemming from
consumption. We have shown that this framework delivers, as a first result, a fundamental
trade-off between the overall advantages of trade liberalisation and the degree of greenness
of the world economy: free trade may represent a first best equilibrium only if a sufficiently
large share of the world population is suffering from pollution in autarky.
Our analysis has taken into account three additional analytical dimensions. The first
one is pivoted on the efficiency of trade policies. Looking at the design of such instru-
ments, we have found that, if countries are sufficiently different in size, our framework
does not support the adoption of any policy to accompany the opening of trade. In the
remaining cases, i.e., for (almost) symmetric country sizes, an export subsidy in favour of
the green firm may be instead required to ensure the bilateral opening to trade. The sec-
ond extension concerns the role of asymmetric information on the equilibrium outcomes.
We encompass this asymmetry by assuming that the government of the larger (brown)
country avails of some private information on emission intensity. This is shown to have
effects only on the distribution of the gains stemming from trade liberalisation: as far
as the government can declare a lower level of environmental damage, it intentionally
underestimates the beneficial effects of green imports from the smaller country and may
demand a larger share of the overall free trade welfare gain in order to open commer-
cial frontiers. However, things change when considering the third analytical dimension,
consisting in the endogenisation of the emission intensity via technology transfer. In this
case, we show that, if information is symmetric, countries have an incentive to trade in
green technology until the externality disappears altogether, which represents the first
best. Otherwise, if information is asymmetric, the brown country sistematically trades
emission abatement for its informational rent.
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A Autarky and free trade
A.1 Autarkic equilibrium
The autarkic equilibrium definitions of other relevant magnitudes are:
pA1 = s−
1
4
α2; pA2 = s−
1
4
(1− α)2; (A.1)
piA1 =
α
4
(4s− α2); piA2 =
1− α
4
[4s− (1− α)2];
TCA1 =
1
12
α3; TCA2 =
1
12
(1− α)3;
CSA1 =
1
6
α3; CSA2 =
1
6
(1− α)3.
SWA1 = α
(
s− 1
12
α2
)
; SWA2 = (1− α)[s−
1
12
(1− α)2 − β].
A.2 The free trade equilibrium
Remaining equilibrium magnitudes are:
TCT1 =
α3
3
; TCT2 =
1
12
(
1− 4α3) ; (A.2)
CST1 = α
(
s− 1− 1
3
α2
)
; CST2 = s(1− α) +
1
3
(
3α + α3 − 13
4
)
;
SW T1 =
1
2
− α (1− s)− α
3
3
; SW T2 = s (1− α) + α +
α3
3
− β
2
− 7
12
.
B Trade policy
B.1 Optimal tariff τ ∗
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for τ = τ ∗:
pTτ1 =
1
3
(7− 4α− 2β); pTτ2 =
1
3
(5− 2α− β); (B.1)
piTτ1 =
1
18
[−32α2 + (1 + β)2 + 2α(20− 7β)] ; piTτ2 = 118(5− 2α− β)2;
TCTτ1 =
α3
3
; TCTτ2 =
1
36
[
3− 12α3 + (2− 2α− β)2] ;
CSTτ1 =
α[3s+ (4− α)α + 2β − 7]
3
;
CSTτ2 =
36s(1− α) + 4α[28− α(11− 3α)] + 14β − 20αβ + β2 − 71
36
;
SW Tτ1 =
1
18
[
2α(9s− β − 1)− 8α2 − 6α3 + (1 + β)2] ;
SW Tτ2 =
1
12
[
12s(1− α) + 4α (1 + α + α2)− 10β + 4αβ + β2 − 3] .
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B.2 Optimal subsidy for firm 2’s sales (θ∗2)
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for θ2 = θ
∗
2:
pTθ21 =
1
3
(1 + 2α); pTθ22 =
1
3
(4α− 1); (B.2)
piTθ21 =
1
18
(1 + 2α)2; piTθ22 =
1
18
[4α (13− 8α)− 11] ;
TCTθ21 =
α3
3
; TCTθ22 =
1
36
[
7 + 4α
(
α− 3α2 − 2)] ;
CSTθ21 =
α[3s− (1 + α)2]
3
;
CSTθ22 = s(1− α)
1 + 4α[α(7 + 3α)− 8]
36
;
SW Tθ21 =
1 + 3β − 2α [1− 9s+ α (4 + 3α) + 6β]
18
;
SW Tθ22 = s(1− α) +
α (1 + α + α2 + 3β)
3
− 1
4
− β.
B.3 Optimal subsidy for firm 1’s sales (θ∗1)
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for θ1 = θ
∗
1:
pTθ11 =
3
2
− 2α; pTθ12 =
5
4
− α; (B.3)
piTθ11 =
9 + 16α (3− 5α)
32
; piTθ12 =
(5− 4α)2
32
;
TCTθ11 =
α3
3
; TCTθ12 =
19− 8α (3− 6α + 8α2)
192
;
CSTθ11 =
α [6s+ 2α(6− α)− 9]
6
; CSTθ12 = s(1− α)
8α (69− 42α + 8α2)− 277
192
;
SW Tθ11 = α
(
s− 3
2
)
+
9
16
+ α
(
α− α
2
3
)
;
SW Tθ12 = s(1− α)
8α (39− 30α + 8α2 + 12β)− 127− 120β
192
.
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Graphical Appendix
Figure 1: Welfare effects of trade liberalisation, parameters’ ranges
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Figure 2: Welfare effects of trade liberalisation with τ ∗, parameters’ ranges
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Figure 3: Welfare effects of trade liberalisation with θ1, parameters’ ranges
(0;0)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
β
0.3 0.4 0.5
α
0.875
0.625
0.25
0.386
0.187
6
β = β =
8α[11+2(α−4)α]−37
8(4α−3)
?
β = 1+8α
24−32α

+∆SW
A,Tθ1
2 > 0
∆SWA,Tθ1 > 0
∆SWA,Tθ12 < 0
∆SWA,Tθ1 > 0
∆SWA,Tθ12 < 0
∆SWA,Tθ1 < 0
31
Figure 4: Equilibria, parameters’ ranges
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